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PROBABILITIES AND PROOF:
CAN HLA AND BLOOD GROUP TESTING
PROVE PATERNITY?
IRA MARK ELLMAN*
DAVID KAYE**
INTRODUCTION
Rabelais tells the story of Judge Bridlegoose, who appeared in
his own defense before the High Court of Mirelinguais to clarify his
grounds for a doubtful decision. The judge explained that he always
decided cases by casting dice for plaintiff and defendant and awarding
judgment to the party with the higher score. He conceded that in the
questioned case, because of failing eyesight in his advancing years, he
may have misread the dice, especially since they were very small.
Still, he urged, in his forty years on the bench the High Court had
never failed to uphold his judgments. I
Judge Bridlegoose's jurisprudence has the virtue of being easily
understood. Nor can one quarrel with an appropriate application of
probability theory to decisionmaking. The problem, of course, is that
judge Bridlegoose's use of the laws of chance is neither appropriate
nor fair. 2  For one thing, it assumes that the evidence in every case
is evenly balanced. 3
One might suppose that this sixteenth century satire would have
no counterpart in the modem operation of the law. Yet, a growing
number of courts appear to be making the same sort of error. For
example, in Cramer v. Morrison,4 a paternity action, a California
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University. B.A., 1967, Reed College; M.A.,
1969, University of Illinois; J.D., 1973, University of California, Berkeley.
** Professor of Law, Arizona State University. S.B., 1968, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; M.A., 1969, Harvard University; J.D., 1972, Yale University. The authors wish to
thank Tara Ellman, H. Robert Horvitz, and Dennis Young for reviewing earlier drafts of this
article. They are especially indebted to Dennis Karjala for many helpful discussions of the prob-
lems raised by probability calculations and their use at trial.
I F. RABELAIS, GARGANTUA AND PANTAGRUEL 288-321 (1928) (1st ed. Paris & Lyons 1532-
1564). Our attention was called to Rabelais' account by Sir Richard Eggleston's book, Evi-
DENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY, which opens with a similar synopsis of Judge Bridlegoose's
travails. R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY 1 (1978).
2 See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-39 (1978); Raz, Legal Princi-
ples and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 847-48 (1972).
3 See generally Kaye, Book Review, 89 YALE L.J. 601, 609-10 (1980) (reviewing M.
FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF MATHE-
MATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978)).
4 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979).
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court of appeals held that the trial court erred in excluding expert
testimony that "there was a 98.3 percent chance" that the defendant
was the father. 5 This calculation was based on results obtained from
a tissue typing test for Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA), and the
appellate court was obviously impressed with the underlying sci-
ence. 6 Nevertheless, the testimony in Cramer and other cases 7
suffered from the same methodological flav which afflicted Judge
Bridlegoose's application of probability theory. That testimony pre-
supposed that the evidence, apart from the HLA test, was evenly
balanced. Unlike Judge Bridlegoose's error, however, the mistake in
Cramer and comparable cases is far from transparent. Indeed, it re-
quires no small effort to unearth it and still more study to correct it.
The problem merits study, however, for at least two reasons.
The first is eminently practical. The biology underlying the statistical
evidence in such cases offers a wealth of previously unavailable in-
formation which is certain to revolutionize the adjudication of pater-
nity disputes. Accordingly, it is important that the courts not become
so mesmerized by these new sources of evidence that they neglect to
subject them to traditional principles of evidence applicable to all tes-
timony. Assuring such consistency requires a more sophisticated un-
derstanding of the new evidence than has thus far been exhibited by
the courts, the commentators, and even the expert witnesses them-
selves.
The second reason this problem deserves serious attention has
less immediate practical significance but may be more important in
the long run. For some time, scholars have disagreed on the proper
application of the laws of probability, and more particularly, a proba-
5 Id. at 878, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68. The trial judge granted defendant's motion to
exclude this testimony on the ground that "there was a possibility that statistical evidence of this
nature would have a prejudicial effect on the jury which would outweigh its probative value."
Id., 153 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
6 See id. at 884-85, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
7 HLA tests have been accepted as evidence of paternity by trial courts in Minnesota, New
Jersey, and Oregon. See Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W. 2d 342, 347 (Minn. 1979) (dictum);
Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 515-16, 401 A.2d 279, 279-80 (1979); Cannadv, Tihue
Typing Narrows Odds in Paternity Cases, 39 OR. B.J. 18 (1979). See also Lascaris v. Lardeo,
100 Misc. 2d 220, 227, 417 N.Y.S.2d 665, 669 (Fam. Ct. 1979) (ordering Department of Social
Services to pay for HLA testing in paternity suit). Cramer was followed by another court of
appeals in California. County of Fresno v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 133, 136-38, 154
Cal. Rptr. 660, 662-63 (1979). At least one state recently amended its statute to permit proof of
paternity by blood group tests. Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-847(c) (West Supp. 1979).
The traditional rule in paternity actions in the United States is that the results of blood
tests are admissible solely to exclude the possibility that the defendant is the father of the child
in question. Serologic tests, in other words, cannot be introduced to prove paternity. See, e.g.,
J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 696, 699-705, 285 N.W.2d 880, 881-84 (Ct. App. 1979); H. KRAUSE,
ILLEGITIMACY: LA-w AND SOCIAL POLICY 127-31 (1971).
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bility formula called Bayes' Theorem, to questions of proof. 8 The
development of HLA and other serologic tests appears to mark the
first time that probabilistic evidence will so dominate a field of law
that virtually all future adjudication will depend on the resolution of
these long debated questions. The evidence yielded by modern
serologic tests is inherently quantitative and probabilistic, and the ac-
cepted method for calculating these probabilities involves Bayes' for-
mula. Questions concerning the use of Bayesian calculations in the
trial setting will thus have to be decided in these paternity disputes.
Such rulings will undoubtedly influence judicial reaction to offers of
similar probability evidence in other substantive fields.
This Article, therefore, undertakes a critical analysis of the use of
probability calculations in paternity cases and of the broader issues
implicit in this growing practice. Briefly stated, although we believe
that the statistical information derived from HLA testing should be
admissible in paternity cases, we doubt that any expert-no matter
how skilled in biochemistry or biostatistics-can correctly testify to
any quantified probability that the defendant in a given case is in fact
the father. 9 To explain our misgivings about such testimony, we first
review the difficulties associated with traditional evidentiary
techniques in paternity cases. We next discuss the nature and appeal
of HLA and other modem serologic techniques for resolving paternity
disputes. Then, we explore the statistical reasoning which necessarily
underlies the expert testimony in cases like Cramer. Finally, we re-
view the problems associated with statistical identification evidence
and conclude by endorsing more suitable alternatives to the
methodology currently used in paternity litigation.
I
TRADITIONAL MODES OF PROOF
In this age of pocket calculators, systems analysis, and occasional
numerology, it should come as no surprise to hear courts and
commentators lament that paternity is typically determined by
8 See, e.g., R. EGGLESTON, supra note 1, at 145-47; M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE
METHODS IN LAw (1978); Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal
Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978); Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1970); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329 (1971); Wagner, Book Review, 1979
DUKE L.J. 1071.
9 We are speaking of probability estimates tending to confirm paternity. In cases in which
the medical evidence is inconsistent with the defendant's being the father, testimony to the
effect that the probability of paternity appproaches zero is not subject to the abuses we identify.
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"extraordinarily flimsy evidence for which there is no quantitative measure
of value." '0 A paternity suit is often a battle of conflicting stories told
by persons obviously hostile to one another. Since the relevant acts
have ordinarily been carried on in private, directly corroborating tes-
timony is rare. Perhaps in desperation, judges have been known to
permit exhibition of the child to the jurors, so that they may assess his
resemblance to the defendant. " In this absence of more probative
evidence, most jurisdictions allow a defense known as exceptio
plurium concubentium, under which the defendant may escape liabil-
ity by shoing that the mother had sexual relations with some other
man during the possible period of conception. 12 Of course, were he
then charged, the other man could use the same defense, relying
upon the testimony of the prior defendant. The temptation to perjure
oneself to help out a friend may be too great to resist. In an often
cited Chicago study, 13 an attempt was made to measure the inci-
dence of perjury in paternity cases through the use of lie detectors.
When confronted with the machine, 57% of the male witnesses who
had testified, for the purpose of establishing an exceptio pluriwn de-
fense, that they had had intercourse with the complainant during the
conception period, admitted to the examiner that they had lied. 14
On the other hand, 48% of the mothers were shown to have lied
when they denied having had intercourse with another man during
the period of conception, and 88% of the defendants admitted having
lied in court about the number of times they had had intercourse
with the mother. 15 A reliable scientific test determining paternity
,
would provide welcome relief.
10 Beautyman, Paternity Actions-A Matter of Opinion or a Trial of the Blood? J. LEGAL
MED., Apr. 1976, at 20, quoted in Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 885, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 865, 872 (1979). For a general discussion of problems in proving paternity, see Holz, The
Trial oe [sic) a Paternity Case, 50 MARQ. L. REv. 450 (1967).
11 See J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON EVIDENCE 102-03 (6th ed. 1973).
12 See, e.g., Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 657, 414 P.2d 382, 390, 51 Cal. Rptr.
254, 262 (1966) (dictum); Holmes v. McLean, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 476, 482, 256 A.2d 849, 853 (1969);
Yarmack v. Strickland, 193 So. 2d 212, 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Steed v. State, 80 Ga.
App. 360, 367, 56 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1949); Bethel v. Todosijevic, 141 Ind. App. 504, 506, 230
N.E.2d 107, 107-08 (1967); Commissioner of Social Servs. ex rel. Debra M. v. James H , 65
A.D.2d 772, 773, 409 N.Y.S.2d 790, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Oregon ex rel. Leonard v. Hogan, 32
Or. App. 89, 94, 573 P.2d 328, 329-30 (1978); Jacobsen v. State, 205 Wis. 304, 306, 237 N.W.
142, 143 (1931); see Note, Liability of Possible Fathers: A Support Remedy for Illegitimate
Children, 18 STAN. L. REv. 859, 862-65 (1966).
13 Arthur & Reid, Utilizing the Lie Detector Technique to Determine the Truth in Disputed
Paternity Cases, 45 J. CriM. L.C. & P.S. 213 (1954).
14 Id. at 215.
15 Id. at 217.
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The use of blood test evidence in paternity actions did not begin
until the 1930's. Most frequently offered was a test based on the ABO
blood typing system, but all such tests operate on the same basic
principles. Human genes direct the expression of many easily identi-
fiable characteristics. In particular, certain genes direct the synthesis
of the chemicals, called antigens, which establish blood types. 16
Since different versions, or alleles, as they are called, of these genes
express distinct antigens, the presence of a specific antigen indicates a
particular genetic composition, or genotype. 17 Thus, the blood type
antigens may be thought of as genetic markers. 18
If one knows the father's genotype for a trait, such as blood type,
then one also knows something about the child's. This is because hu-
mans, like many other organisms, possess genes in pairs, inherited
one from each parent. If the putative father's pair of alleles for that
characteristic are absent in the child-if neither of the child's pair is
the same as either of the putative father's-then that man cannot be
the father unless there has been a mutation. Mutations are suffi-
ciently rare that they may be disregarded for the purpose of deter-
mining paternity. 19 On the other hand, if the child and the putative
father do share one allele of the gene pair in common, then it is
16 See HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1697 (8th ed. G. Thorn, E.
Braunuald, K. Isselbacher & R. Petersdorf 1977).
17 A more comprehensive description of the mechanisms and terminology of inheritance can
be found in any elementary text on biology or genetics. See, e.g., W. BODMER & L. CAvALLI-
SFORZA, GENETICS, EVOLUTION, AND MAN 18-137 (1976).
"8 More generally, antigens (also called immunogens) are large molecules (usually proteins,
polysaccharides or nucleic acids) that, when introduced into an animal, are capable of eliciting
the formation of antibodies. Antibodies are proteins synthesized by cells called lymphocytes and
embedded in the cell membrane. An antibody coming into contact with its corresponding anti-
gen binds to the antigen to form an antigen-antibody complex. See L. STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY
732-52 (1975).
The antigens on the surface of red blood cells thus determine one's blood type. The intro-
duction of red blood cells from one person into the blood of another person will stimulate the
production of antibodies unless the foreign antigens are indistinguishable from the host anti-
gens. Since the antigens are synthesized according to genetic instructions, they not only deter-
mine blood type, but also reveal something about the underlying genotype. See L. SUSSMAN,
PATERNITY TESTING By BLOOD GROUPING 3-13 (2d ed. 1976); Terasald, Resolution by HLA
Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. FAm. L. 543 (1978).
Antigens embedded in membranes of other cells can, in like fashion, be thought of as genetic
markers pointing to other systems of genes, see text accompanying notes 37-44 infra, and any
test that detects antigens by using antibodies (antisera) to form observable antigen-antibody
complexes (agglutination) is called a serologic test. Even if these chemical tests are properly
performed, however, confusion as to the alleles that correspond to the putative father's antigens
can arise if more than one genotype could express the antigens that are detected. For simplicity
of presentation, we shall assume that the types for antigenicity permit an undquivocal identifica-
tion of genotypes.
19 See e.g., Neel, The Study of Human Mutation Rates, 86 AM. NATURALIST 129, 131
(1952); Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322, 332-33 (1960).
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possible the accused is indeed the father. And if that shared allele were
unique to them-if no other person had a genotype which includes
it-paternity would be established. However, most alleles are hardly
unique. Indeed, under the traditional ABO testing system, the failure
to exclude the accused meant, on the average, that he was one of the
86.6% of the male population that might have the possible
genotype. 20 Such evidence is obviously not very probative, and
courts therefore have declined to admit it, since it is also deemed
prejudicial. 21
Even blood test evidence excluding the defendant was not admit-
ted at first, though courts gradually became more confident of it. 22
Yet once admissible, there remained the question of the weight of
such evidence. For some time, courts were reluctant to make such
evidence determinative. In a famous case brought against Charlie
Chaplin the court sustained a jury verdict for the complainant, de-
spite blood test evidence excluding Chaplin. 23 Even modem courts
occasionally permit juries to find defendants liable despite serological
evidence of nonpaternity. 24
The first attempt to resolve these questions comprehensively
game with the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity
(UABT), proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1952. It dealt with the Chaplin situation by making exculpatory blood
20 Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed
Parentage, 10 F,,i. L.Q. 247, 257-58 (1976). Because of differing frequencies of the four blood
types in the various racial groups, the probability of exclusion varies from group to group. Id.
This percentage is lower than it might be because we do not ordinarily test directly for
genotype. In the ABO system, for example, tests are made for the blood types of the parties,
which yield only partial information about the genotypes. A person with Type A blood, for
example, could have a genotype of either AA or AO, since "0" is a recessive trait that will
manifest iself only if both alleles in the pair are Type 0. See W. BODMER & L. CAVALLI-
SFORZA, supra note 17, at 216, 247-49.
21 See, e.g., Sheridan v. Curl, 275 A.D. 966, 966, 86 N.Y.S.2d 785, 785 (1949); State ex rel.
Freeman v. Morris, 156 Ohio St. 333, 337, 102 N.E.2d 450, 452 (1951).
22 Compare Commonwealth v. Krutsick, 151 Pa. Super. 164, 168-69, 30 A.2d 325, 326-27
(1943) and State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 136-37, 252 N.W. 7, 12 (1933) with Jordan v. Mace,
144 Me. 351, 353-55, 69 A.2d 670, 672 (1949) and State ex rel. Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio St.
305, 312-15, 58 N.E.2d 773, 776-77 (1944).
23 Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 664-65, 169 P.2d 442, 450-51 (1946).
24 See State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 152-53, 209 S.E.2d 754, 756-57 (1974), in which the
court sustained a conviction for failure to make child support payments of a man with Type 0
blood. The mother also had Type 0, but the child had Type A. The jury heard expert testimony
that correctly stated that it was not possible for the defendant to be the father. For a case which
reviews the weight accorded exclusionary test results among the jurisdictions, see Hanson v.
Hanson, 311 Minn. 388, 390-91, 249 N.W.2d 452, 453 (1977). See also Annot., Admissibility
and Weight of Blood Test Results in Immigration Preference or Derivative Citizenship Proceed-
ings Under Immigration and Nationality Act, 46 A.L.R. FED. 176, 190-93 (1980).
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test evidence determinative. 25 In addition, it allowed the trial judge
to admit evidence of nonexclusion "depending upon the infrequency
of the blood type." 2 6  But while a number of states adopted the
UABT, few included this provision. 27 This pattern continued when
provisions similar to the UABT were incorporated into the Uniform
Paternity Act, adopted by the Commissioners in 1960.28
The more recent Uniform Parentage Act, adopted by the Com-
missioners in 1973, provides simply that "[e]vidence relating to
paternity may include ... blood test results, weighted in accordance
with evidence, if available, of the statistical probability of the alleged
father's paternity." 29 This entire section was omitted in California, 30
but was followed unchanged by the six other jurisdictions which
adopted the Parentage Act.31 As regards confirmatory blood test re-
sults, therefore, the various Uniform Acts recognize that at some
point the frequency of possible paternal blood type might be so low
as to make the match between the defendant and the child so proba-
tive that evidence of the genetic similarity should not be suppressed.
II
THE NEW BIOLOGY
In the years following the discovery of the four blood types that
comprise the original ABO system, more and more blood antigens
have been recognized. 32  With this proliferation of blood types has
25 UNIFoRM ACT ON BLOOD TESTS To DETERMINE PATERNrry § 4 (1952).
26 Id.
27 A 1963 survey found only three of the seven jurisdictions that had adopted the
UABT-Oregon, New Hampshire, and the Panama Canal Zone-had included this provision.
Harris, Some Observations on the Un-Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, 9
VILL. L. REv. 59, 70 (1963). By 1973, nine states had adopted the UABT. 9A UNIFOm LAWS
ANN. 579 (1979).
28 UNIFORIM PATERNITY ACT § 10 (1960). The Act has been adopted officially by five states and
substantially by one more. One state, however, did not incorporate this section. 9A UNIFORM
LAws ANN. 623, 625, 635-36 (1979).
29 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 12(3) (1973).
30 9A UNIFORM LAWs ANN. 604 (1979).
31 See id. at 579, 604.
32 The definitive reference on human blood types is R. RACE & R. SANGER, BLOOD GROUPS
IN MAN (6th ed. 1975). Useful elementary descriptions of the genetics of blood types can be
found in W. BODMER & L. CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 17, at 215-17, 329-42, and in M.
FARNSWORTH, GENETICS 50-57 (1978). The underlying biochemistry and genetics of several of
the blood group systems is summarized in more detail in Watkins, Genetics and Biochemistry of
Some Human Blood Groups, 202 Ploc. ROYAL SOCY LONDON 31, 31-53 (series B 1978). Sev-
eral "blood type" antigens occur as cell surface antigens on many cells outside the blood stream.
Id. at 32.
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come the possibility of testing for some relatively uncommon genetic
markers. 3 3 As already observed, when the defendant is randomly
selected from the white population, the chance that he will be
excluded by ABO typing alone has been calculated to be only .134, or
13.4%. 34 Testing for the three MN types and the Rh-Hr system
raises the cumulative "probability of exclusion" for all three typing
systems combined to .566, or 56.6%. 3 With additional tests, which
are not routinely done in paternity cases but are technically feasible,
the cumulative probability of exclusion approaches .75, or 75%. 36
In addition to the numerous blood tests, the recently discovered
HLA system provides a rich source of genetic information about those
accused of paternity and their putative offspring. 37 The HLA system
is the most complex genetic system known in man. 38  It consists of,
at a minimum, hundreds of closely linked genes 39 that function in
determining the susceptibility to certain diseases, 40 the immune re-
33 The chemical and physical techniques used to ascertain blood types are described by A.
DELATT, PRIMER OF SEROLOGY (1976); G. GRANT & W. BUTT, IMMUNOCHEMICAL METHODS
IN CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 383-466 (0. Bodansky & C. Stewart eds. 1970).
34 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
35 Weiner, Likelihood of Parentage, in PATERNITY TESTING BY BLOOD GROUPING 124, 129
(2d ed. L. Sussman 1976).
36 P. Terasaki, HLA Testing, A New 95% Paternity Exclusion Test 1 (unpublished
pamphlet) (n.d.).
37 See A. SVEJGAARD, M. HAUGE, C. JERSILD, P. PLATZ, L. RYDER, L. STAUB NIELSEN C
M. THOMSEN, THE HLA SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 67 (L. Beckman & M. Hauge
eds. 1975) [hereinafter A. SVEJGAARD, THE HLA SYSTEM]; Terasaki, supra note 18.
Two additional approaches that have not yet been used in paternity cases promise to suppl,
even more information about human genotypes. One of these, chromosome banding, is already
under study for use in paternity testing. This procedure involves the application of certain dyes
to generate distinctive staining patterns, or bands, that can be observed when chromosomes are
viewed under a microscope. The other approach is farther from implementation, but it may
prove to be the most discriminating test for paternity. It would entail the application of recom-
binant DNA techniques to analyze the nucleotide sequence of the DNA that constitutes the
genes themselves. Interview with H. Robert Horvitz, Department of Biology, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (May 25, 1980).
38 Terasald, supra note 18, at 8; see W. BODMER & L. CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 17, at
346; Bodmer & Bodmer, Evolution and Function of the HLA System, 34 BRIT. MED, BULL.
309, 309-16 (1978); Bodmer, Jones, Barnstable & Bodmer, Genetics of HLA: The Major Human
Histocompatibility System, 202 PRoc. ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON 93 (series B 1978) (hereinafter
Bodmer, Genetics of HLA]; Boettcher, Immunogenetics, in TxTBOOK OF HUMAN GENETICS
326, 353 (G. Fraser & 0. Mayo eds. 1975).
39 See A. SVEJGAARD, THE HLA SYSTEM, supra note 37, at 8. The genetic loci carrying the
HLA alleles are in four regions (denoted A, B, C, and D) of chromosome six. They have been
estimated to represent 1/1000th of the human genetic material. Id. at 9; Bodmer & Thompson,
Population Genetics and Evolution of the HLA System, in HLA AND DISEASE 280 (J. Dausset &
A. Svejgaard eds. 1977).
40 See, e.g., W. BODMER & L. CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 17, at 352-53; Bodmer, Ge-
netics of HLA, supra note 38, at 102-03; Cudworth & Festenstein, HLA Genetic Heterogeneity in
Diabetes Mellitus, 34 BRIT. MED. BULL. 285 (1978); Motulsky, The HLA Complex and Disease.
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sponse, 41 and the rejection of transplanted tissue. 42 Despite the
name "leucocyte antigen," the factors expressed by the HLA genes
are present in most cells, 43 and HLA testing can be thought of as
tissue typing rather than blood group typing.44
Since many combinations of the numerous antigens, or genetic
markers, in the HLA system are observed to occur very infrequently
in the population at large, 45 HLA typing excludes a high proportion
of falsely accused defendants. A man is excluded if he and the mother
both lack an antigen which the child has, or if the child lacks an
antigen which any offspring of the defendant and the mother would
necessarily possess. 46 Given the statistics on the prevalence of the
various antigens, it has been said that typing for HLA alone provides
about as much information as can be obtained by the investigation of
all the genetic markers routinely used in blood tests for paternity. 
47
Indeed, some proponents argue that HLA testing is even more valu-
able. 48 Used in this exclusionary fashion and employed with proper
sensitivity to the risk of false test results, 49 the new blood tests and
300 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 918, 918-19 (1979); Rosenberg & Kidd, HLA and Disease Suscepti-
bility: A Primer, 297 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1060, 1061-62 (1977).
41 See W. BODMER & L. CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 17, at 352; A. SVEJGAARD, THE HLA
SYSTEM, supra note 37, at 20-21; Crumpton, Snary, Walsh, Barnstable, Goodfellow, Jones &
Bodmer, Molecular Structure of the Gene Products of the Human HLA System: Isolation and
Characterization of HLA-A,-B,-C and Ia Antigens, 202 PROc. ROYAL Soc'y LONDON 159 (series
B 1978).
42 See W. BODMER & L. CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 17, at 343-45; F. POLACK, CORNEAL
TRANSPLANTATION 75 (1977); A. SVEJGAARD, THE HLA SYSTEM, supra note 37, at 40-50;
Bodmer, Genetics of HLA, supra note 38, at 97-98; McDevitt & Bodmer, HL-A, Immune-
response Genes, and Disease, 1 LANCET 1269 (1974); Mittal, Ruder & Green, Matching of
Histocompatibility (HL-A) Antigens for Platelet Transfusion, 47 BLOOD 31, 31-41 (1976).
43 J. BARRETr, TEXTBOOK OF IMMUNOLOGY 386-87 (3d ed. 1978). Cells called lymphocytes
are typically used in HLA testing. See, e.g., id. at 391-93; Bodmer, Genetics of HLA, supra
note 38, at 96; Boettcher, supra note 38, at 353-54.
44 Consequently, it can be argued that HLA typing is not covered by statutes that preclude
the admission of "blood tests" into evidence for the purpose of proving paternity. See J. B. v.
A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 696, 698-705, 285 N.W.2d 880, 881-84 (Ct. App. 1979).
45 See Bodmer, Genetics of HLA, supra note 38, at 97, 100.
4 A. SVEJcAARD, Ti HLA SYSTEM, supra note 37, at 67. The second possibility can be
explained most easily with an example. Restricting our attention to antigens expressed at the A
and B loci, consider a defendant whose two haplotypes are A1,B17 and A3,B14. Ordinarily, one
or the other of these haplotypes must be passed on to any offspring of this defendant. If the
child who is tested has the haplotypes All, B12, and A1,B8, and thus lacks both the defen-
dant's haplotypes, he cannot be the defendant's progeny. For a fuller description of HLA
nomenclature, see id. at 12-16; note 52 infra.
47 See A. SVEJGAARD, THE HLA SYsTEM, supra note 37, at 67.
48 The chief proponent in this country of HLA testing for paternity has claimed, for that
procedure alone, probabilities of exclusion exceeding 90%. P. Terasald, supra note 36; accord,
Bias, 27 Am. J. HuMAN GENETICS 243 (1975) (letter to the editor).
49 See Weiner, supra note 35, at 129-31.
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the HLA tests plainly have much to offer in disproving false claims of
paternity.
It would be wonderfully convenient if these same techniques
could be used to confirm, as well as to negate, accusations of pater-
nity, if forensic medicine by itself could supply the judge or jury with
impersonal, objective, meaningful, accurate, and comprehensible cal-
culations of the probability that an accused is actually the father.
Medical experts now claim the ability to deduce this probability of
paternity, 50 and, in cases such as Cramer, the courts have accepted
their claims. 5 ' These experts believe that HLA testing, for example,
provides positive, quantifiable evidence of paternity when the man
and the child share a set of HLA alleles not found in the mother. The
logic of this argument is deceptively simple. Since most of these HLA
haplotypes, 5 2 as they are called, are rare, the chance is small that a
randomly chosen man will possess the haplotypes of the true
father. 53 Just how rare the haplotype is determines how small the
chance of a random match is. If, for instance, the haplotype shared by
child and father is known to be present in only 5% of the relevant
population, the probability that a randomly chosen defendant would
possess it is only .05, or 5%. We may call this figure the "genetic
frequency" 54 or "probability of a random match." We might then be
50 E.g., A. SVEJGAARD, THE HLA SYSTEM, supra note 37, at 67 ("when the information
obtained by all these markers and HLA is pooled, it usually becomes possible to 'prove' with a
significant probability that a particular man is indeed the true father"); Chakrabortv, Shaw &
Schull, Exclusion of Paternity: The Current State of the Art, 26 Am. J. HUMAN. GENETICS 477,
484-85 (1974); Lee, Current Status of Paternity Testing, 9 FAM. L.Q. 615, 630-33 (1975); Shaw
& Kass, Illegitimacy, Child Support, and Paternity Testing, 13 Hous. L. REv. 41, 59-60 (1975);
Terasaki, supra note 18, at 543-44.
51 See Goodrich v. Norman, 100 Misc. 2d 33, 36-39, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287-89 (Family Ct.
1979); cases cited in note 7 supra. Many legally trained commentators have been effusive in
their praise of the new technology. See, e.g., 1 S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEED-
INGS §§ 8.01-.04 (rev. ed. 1977); Beautyman, supra note 10, at 19-25. The exception is Jaffe,
Comment on the Judicial Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and Other Statistical Evidence: A
Response to Terasaki, 17 J. Fm. L. 457 (1979), who has the surprising belief that reliance on
any statistical evidence to prove an "ultimate fact" is "illogical" and "'procedurally irrational." Id.
at 458.
52 Haplotype refers to the set of genes found on one and the same of the two homologous
chromosomes of a diploid cell. In the absence of genetic aberrations, such as recombinaton, one
of these chromosomes is inherited from one parental sex cell, and another chromosome comes
from the other parent. Recombination (the breakage and crossing over of chromosome seg-
ments) interfering with the pairwise transmission of the HLA alleles that constitute a haplotype
is fairly rare. See W. BODMER & L. CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 17, at 347-50. Thus, an
individual's genotype is almost always the combination of two haplotypes, one from each parent,
see J. BARRETT, supra note 43, at 387; Terasaki, supra note 18, at 545, and the term haplotype
serves as a shorthand for "haploid genotype." See W. BODMER & L. CAVALLI-SFORZA, vupra
note 17, at 343.
53 A. SVEJGAARD, THE HLA SYSTEM, supra note 37, at 67.
-4 By "genetic frequency," we mean the total frequency within the relevant male population
of all those genotypes that the father could have had, given the antigens detected in the child
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tempted to regard the probability of paternity as being the probability
that the match is not mere coincidence, or one minus the probability
of a random match. For the genetic frequency of 5% the correspond-
ing probability of paternity calculated in this way is 1 - .05 = .95, or
95%.
This is the technique which the court of appeals in Cramer er-
roneously believed had been used to arrive at the probability of
paternity in that case. 55 Such a technique, however, is not typically
employed in forensic medicine, and its use in Cramer would have
been quite incorrect. 5 6 The 95% figure just calculated is merely the
probability that a man selected at random from the relevant popula-
tion would be excluded by the test. This probability is more appro-
priately called the "probability of exclusion." It is not the probability
of paternity-the probability that an individual whom the test does
not exclude is the father.
An example helps to illustrate the difference between the proba-
bility of exclusion and the probability of paternity. Suppose it is
known only that the mother lived in Los Angeles at the time of the
child's conception, and that mother and child are Caucasian. One
might assume that the actual father must also have lived in Los
Angeles, but of course that is far from certain. He might have been
visiting from elsewhere, or the mother might have become impreg-
nated on a weekend trip to San Diego. But if we ignore those pos-
sibilities and limit our universe of possible fathers to Caucasian males
past the age of puberty who resided in the Los Angeles area at the
time of conception, we have a suspect list of about two million. A test
which eliminates even 95% of the suspects would still leave 100,000
possible fathers. The fact that the defendant was one of the remaining
100,000 is hardly overwhelming evidence. Although the test has a
probability of exclusion of 95%, the probability of paternity in this
example is only one in 100,000.57
and the mother. This genetic frequency thus specifies how rare the genotypes not excluded by
the serologic examination are. It should not be confused with the "gene frequency." The latter
phrase is used in population genetics to denote the frequency with which a particular allele
occurs out of all the alleles for the gene in question. See M. FARNswoRTH, supra note 32, at
511. When the rates of mutation and recombination are negligible, however, the "genetic fre-
quency" that is crucial in confirmatory use of blood or HLA test results can be derived readily
from the pertinent gene or haplotype frequencies.
55 88 Cal. App. 3d at 867, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
5 See, e.g., Weiner & Socha, Methods Available for Solving Medicolegal Problems of Dis-
puted Parentage, 21 J. FoR. Sci. 42, 61-62 (1976). A more refined but ultimately no more
satisfactory method was actually used by the expert in Cramer. See text accompanying notes
90-92 infra.
57 The point made by this example is effectively made in another context by Tribe, supra
note 8, at 1355.
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Of course this example has some unlikely features. Perhaps the
most questionable aspect of our hypothetical is the assumption that
our knowledge is strictly limited to the test results. Few defendants
are chosen randomly from the population. We ordinarily know more,
sometimes much more. In a typical case, the mother may testifi that
she had intercourse with the defendant, and only the defendant, dur-
ing the period of conception, while the defendant might produce evi-
dence that she had other lovers, and that he was out of town in the
critical period. The problem is to determine how to combine our statis-
tical information based on genetic frequency with the other evidence
available. Only then can a number be produced which can sensibly
be called the probability of paternity in that particular case.
Mathematically, the problem is solved with probability calculations
explained more fully in the next section. That discussion will reveal
two points: first, that the approach actually used in Cramer is errone-
ous, 58 and second, that a mathematically correct approach raises im-
portant policy questions regarding the kind of presentation which
should be made to a jurt. 59
What should now be apparent, however, is that the use of
sophisticated medical tests to prove paternity is simply an instance of
the more general problem of presenting quantified identification evi-
dence to a judge or jury. In this respect, it is no different in principle
from proof of identity by coincidences in fibers from clothing, 6 0 hair
samples, 61 dental characteristics, 62 fingerprints, 63 traces of paint, 64
handwriting or typewriter peculiarities, 65 and so on. 66 Although not
-8 See text accompanying notes 90-98 infra.
59 See text accompanying notes 99-131 infra.
60 See People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal. 2d 105, 112-13, 194 P.2d 681, 685-86, cert, denied, 335
U.S. 887 (1948).
61 See United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676, 679-81 (8th Cir. 1979); State v. Smilev, 27
Ariz. App. 314, 317, 5,54 P.2d 910, 913 (1976).
62 See State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 258-59, 585 P,2d 563, 566-67 (1978), I
GLADFELTER, DENTAL EVIDENCE: A HANDBOOK FOR POLICE (1975).
63 See Osterburg, Parthasarathy, Raghavan & Sclove, Development of a Mathematical For-
mula for the Calculation of Fingerprint Probabilities Based on Individual Characteritcs, 72 J.
Axt. STATISTICAL A. 772 (1977).
64 See People v. Woodward, No. 108551 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo County, July 7, 1964),
criticized in Comment, The Evidentiarj Uses of Neutron Activation Analysi, 59 CALIF. L.
REv. 997, 1014-20 (1971); D. CROWN, THE FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF PAINTS AND PIGMENTS
(1968).
6 See People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75, 86-87, 108 N.E. 200, 203 (1915).
66 See State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 417-23, 260 A.2d 547, 558-61 (1969) (matching of
particles of clothing), rev'd on other groundsL, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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fully appreciated by the courts, 67 the dangers associated with the in-
troduction of such statistical identification evidence have been amply
discussed in the literature, 68 and familiarity with the more general
problem is necessary to deal adequately with paternity cases. In the
next section, we discuss some of the concerns that have been voiced
and canvass some of the methods that have been proposed to deal
with them. We conclude that the method by which HLA and blood
test evidence has been presented in recent paternity cases is one of
the more unsatisfactory approaches for using quantified probability es-
timates in litigation, and we identify two more suitable alternatives.
III
THE NEW MATH
The issues posed in paternity litigation by the HLA system and
the extension of blood typing are easily stated: first, should serologic
evidence tending to confirm paternity be admissible?, and second, if
so, how should it be presented? The first question is relatively easy to
answer. Given the low genetic frequencies and correspondingly high
probabilities of exclusion characteristic of HLA and blood typing, the
failure of these tests to exclude a defendant is usually important in
evaluating the allegation of paternity. Unless the test results are re-
markably prejudicial, they are, as both the Cramer court and the
drafters of the Uniform Acts have recognized, simply too probative to
Withhold from the jury. 69
We turn, therefore, to the second question: how can the medical
evidence be presented so as to minimize prejudicial impact and en-
hance the accuracy of the factfinding process? 70 By "prejudice," we
67 Set, e.g., State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 585 P.2d 563 (1978); People v. Trujillo, 32
Cal. 2d 105, 194 P.2d 681, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).
68 See, e.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics," 84 HARV. L.
REv. 1801 (1971); Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1810
(1971); Tribe, supra note 8.
69 See text accompanying notes 5-6 & 25-31 supra.
70 By "accurate factfinding" we mean that resolution of the facts which is most likely to
correspond to the true state of -affairs. Erroneous findings are those that are contrary to the true
state of 'affairs. We realize, of course, that the "true state of affairs" is rarely known in litigation,
but we believe that by and large juries do their best with the limited resources society allocates
to trials to ascertain what "really" happened in a given case. Strict pursuit of the goal of
minimizing total errors implies that civil cases should be decided for plaintiffs whenever the
relevant probability exceeds one-half. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, at 66-67; Kaye, supra
note 3, at 604-05.
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mean the danger that the jury will be so awed by the evidence that it
will give it more weight than it logically deserves. This is surely the
fear which prompted the traditional rule excluding any presentation
of blood tests tending to confirm paternity. 71 The task, then, is to
develop a method of presentation which accurately communicates the
meaning of the test evidence so that the jury can give it proper
weight. The ease with which the probability of exclusion and the
probability of paternity can be confused suggests that this may not be
a simple task.
In this section, we consider a variety of approaches, differing in
the reliance they place upon numerical evidence. In assessing their
relative merits, we must give due weight to psychological as well as
strictly logical or mathematical considerations. The most mathemati-
cally precise and sophisticated statement of the test's meaning might
be entirely incomprehensible to a judge or jury. Alternatively, the
most accessible statement of the evidence may be too inaccurate or
misleading to allow. What is required is a method of presentation
which is at once accurate and intelligible.
A. The Data Approaches
One of the methods placing only minimal reliance on statistical
calculations can be called the data approach. Strictly speaking, the
only medical evidence useful in confirming paternit, consists of tes-
timony as to the alleles shared by the child and the defendant and
the frequency with which corresponding possible paternal genotypes
are found in the pertinent racial and geographic population. Any
further statements, such as calculations of the probability of paternity,
are necessarily derived from these facts and are, in effect, attempts to
tell the judge or jury what conclusions to draw from this data. There-
fore, to prevent the expert testimony from invading the province of
the finder of fact, the data approach would eschew calculations of the
probability of paternity and would confine the expert to presenting
In criminal nonsupport actions, on the other hand, simple minimization of total error, is
inappropriate, since a mistaken verdict for the state may be more objectionable than an errone-
ous acquittal of the defendant. See, e.g., Friedman, Trial by Jury: Criteria for Convictions,
Jury Size and Type I and Type II Errors, AM. STATISTICIAN, Apr. 1972, at 21; Kaplan, Deci-
sion Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1073-82 (1968). Whatever the
optimal burden of proof, however, the problem with which we are concerned is essentially
unchanged. The statistical evidence should be introduced in a fashion which enables it to make
its maximum contribution to the accurate resolution of controverted facts.
71 See, e.g., People v. Nichols, 341 Mich. 311, 329-31, 67 N.W.2d 230, 231-32 (1954); State
ex rel. Freeman v. Morris, 156 Ohio St. 333, 337, 102 N.E.2d 450, 452 (1951).
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the underlying data itself. Two such data approaches can be specified.
Under a strictly qualitative presentation of the data, the expert would
simply tell the jury that the test evidence reveals that the defendant
could have been the father as alleged, and that the alleles or hap-
lot pe the child and the father have in common are rarely found in
the population at large. In contrast, under a quantitative presenta-
tion, a statistical statement of precisely how rare the genetic charac-
teristics in question are would be included-one out of twenty, one
out of a hundred, one out of a hundred thousand, or whatever figure
is appropriate. That figure, the genetic frequency, is, as already re-
marked, the probability of a random match. 72
The difficulty with the purely qualitative presentation is that itfails to give the juv a clear indication of the probative force of the
test data. Any verbal description of the genetic frequency is necessar-
ilv a translation from the numerical, and precision is inevitably lost in
that translation. One expert, for instance, might regard a haplotype
frequency as .rare," while another may call it "uncommon." If quan-
tification is precluded, the jury has no way of knowing whether their
disagreement is over the distribution of genes, the use of words, or
some combination of the two. Clarity requires that the expert quan-
tifv his estimate.
Nevertheless, in other areas of litigation involving identification
evidence, a quantitative presentation has been criticized as tending to
misdirect the jury's attention from important, nonquantifiable matters
and as conveying a false sense of certainty. 73 In People v. Collins, 74
the leading case concerning quantified probability estimates, the Sup-
reme Court of California held that the trial court erred by admitting
testimony that only one out of twelve million randomly selected
couples would be expected to fit the witnesses' description of the
couple that robbed a woman in Los Angeles. 75 The state supreme
court warned that "[m]athematics, a veritable sorcerer in our com-
puterized society, while assisting the trier of fact in the search for
truth, must not cast a spell over him." 76 Presumably, this gen-
eralized concern for the undue impact of statistical evidence lay be-
hind the rejection by the trial court in Cramer v. Morrison of the
98.3% figure as "prejudicial." 77
72 See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
73 The most penetrating critique is Tribe, supra note 8.
74 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
75 Id. at 332-33, 438 P.2d at 41-42, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 500-02.
76 Id. at 320, 438 P.2d at 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
7 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 877, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 867 (1979).
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Although this problem is also present in paternity litigation, it
should be possible to overcome it so that the statistical information,
clearly of probative value, can be admitted. The conventional ap-
proach would be to rely on counsel 78 to place the test evidence in its
proper context along with direct testimony as to the sexual relation-
ships of the mother. The success of this approach requires avoiding
the error made in Cramer, namely, confusing the probability of ex-
clusion with the probability of paternity. An example such as the one
in section II concerning our hypothetical Los Angeles mother, 79
might suffice in clarifying the meaning of the probability of exclusion
for the jury. Similarly, counsel could explain that a genetic frequency
of, say, .05, or 5%, implies that, on the average, every twentieth
person tested at random would be identified as the father. 80
B. The Probability of Paternity Approaches
A more mathematically advanced way to utilize statistical evi-
dence is to go beyond a quantified and suitably explained statement
of the probability of exclusion, and to calculate the probability of
paternity itself. The argument for proceeding with the probability
presentation is clear: if done properly, it is the most accurate way of
conveying the significance of the test data. The data is itself statistical
in nature-the defendant is one of a measured percentage of the
population which possess a trait that the true father necessarily
has-and its meaning is most precisely expressed in probabilistic
terms. Moreover, once it has been explained to the jury that the
probability of exclusion is not the probability of paternity, the ques-
tion arises of what the probability of paternity is. In this section,
therefore, we discuss various methods (including the one currently
accepted and utilized in forensic medicine) for calculating and pre-
senting to the jury the probability of paternity.
78 See Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 68, at 1806-07. In People v. Collins, however, the.
court noted that "few defense attorneys ... could be expected to comprehend th[e] basic flaw"
in the prosecution's use of probabilistic evidence. 68 Cal. 2d at 331, 438 P.2d at 41, 66 Cal.
Rptr. at 505. Nevertheless, it is hard to see why the rudiments of statistical reasoning should
remain so intimidating and inaccessible to practicing lawyers, and there are signs that legal
education can adapt to advances in other disciplines. See, e.g., D. BALDUS & J. COLE, Sr-,rIS-
TICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980); M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8; R. LEMPERT
& SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 998-1034 (1977).
79 See text accompanying note 57 supra.
80 If p is the probability of a random match, then it can be shown from sampling theory that
one would expect, on the average, every 1/pth person in the relevant population tested at
random to show a match. In Cramer v. Morrison, for example, it appears that the paternal
haplotype found in the child had been observed in only 1.73% of the white male population.
Hence, one would expect, on the average, every 1.0173 or every 58th, Caucasian male tested
to be identified by his HLA type as a possible father.
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1. The Binomial Calculation
In our Los Angeles hypothetical, we calculated a probability of
paternity of one in 100,000 by simply applying the probability of a
random match-.05-to the local white adult male population.81
This calculation rests on what is technically called a binomial proba-
bility distribution model. 82 This model was employed by the court
in People v. Collins83 to conclude that even with the 1 in 12,000,000
figure-analogous to a probability of exclusion of practically one-the
conditional probability that there existed in the Los Angeles area at
least one couple in addition to the one apprehended fitting the rob-
bers' description was about .41, or 41%.84
As mentioned earlier, this method of transforming the genetic
frequency statistic into a probability of paternity is not at all suit-
able.8 5 It requires an accurate specification of the relevant population
size-a figure which ordinarily is not available. 86 Moreover, it pre-
supposes that every man of the right race, location, and genotype is
equally likely to be the true father. Hence, the very phrase probabil-
ity of paternity as applied to the product of such calculations is mis-
leading, since the number arrived at ignores all the nonquantitative
evidence in the case. For these reasons, no probability of paternity
derived using the binomial model should be put before the jury.
2. Bayesian Calculations
To overcome the defects in the binomial model, so-called
Bayesian techniques could be used to combine the quantitative medi-
cal evidence with all the other evidence in the case to deduce one
overall probability of paternity. Bayes' Theorem, a basic formula of
"I See text accompanying note 57 supra.
82 Set Fairley & Mosteller, A Conversation About Collins, 41 U. CHi. L. REV. 242, 250
n.13 (1974).
E, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
84 68 Cal. 2d at 333-35, 438 P.2d at 42-43, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07 (appendix). The Collins
court's mathematical demonstration is based on an approximation of the binomial distribution
with the population size taken to be the reciprocal of the frequency of the identifying charac-
teristics. This assumption about the population size is artificial, and a number of refinements
and improvements of the court's mathematical model have been proposed. See, e.g., Charrow &
Smith, A Conversation About "'A Conversation About Collins," 64 GEo. L.J. 669 (1976); Smith
& Charrow. Upper and Lower Bounds for Probabiliiy of Guilt Based on Circumstantial Evi-
dence, 70 J. Amr. STATISTICAL A. 555 (1975).
85 See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
86 See. e.g., M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, at 83; Fairley & Mosteller, supra note 82, at
250. But .ee text accompanying note 123 infra. In our example, we somewhat arbitrarily
excluded males living outside Los Angeles and included all those inside the region.
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probability theory, 87 can be used to describe the way new statistical
information alters a previously established probability. 88 Suppose
the probability that a defendant is the father somehow has been es-
tablished without regard to any serologic testing, and let us denote
this prior probability by P(F). Bayes' formula can then be used to
state how the statistical evidence alters this prior probability. If we
designate the probability as revised by the HLA or blood test statis-
tics as P(FIM) (denoting the probability of fatherhood given the gene-
tic match between the defendant and the child), then Bayes' formula
connects the posterior or conditional probability P(FIM) with the
prior probability P(F) as follows: 89
1
P(FI M) = (1)(1-f) + f/P(F)
where
f P(MI not-F) (2)
P (MIF)
These equations, in other words, say that the prior probability of
paternity should be revised according to a fraction-given in equa-
tion (2)-whose denominator is the likelihood of positive test results
given that the defendant is the father, and whose numerator is the
probability the tests would show a match between the defendant and
the child given that the defendant is not actually the father. If the
tests have no false positives, that is, if they never show a genetic
match when none is present, and if defendants are not preselected
according to blood or HLA type, then P(Ml.not-F) is our probability
87 For elementary derivations of Bayes' Theorem, see H. BRUNK, AN INTRODUCTION To
MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 35-37 (3d ed. 1975); M. DEGROOT, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS
.55-60 (1975). For more extended treatments of Bayesian methods, see G Box & G TIAo,
BAYESIAN INFERENCE IN STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (1973); R. WINKLER, INTRODUCTION T41
BAYESIAN INFERENCE AND DECISION (1972). Bayes' original paper, "An Essay Towards Solviig
a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances," dated 1763, is reprinted in STUDIES IN THE HIsToRy
OF STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY 134-53 (E. Pearson & M. Kendall eds. 1970).
88To avoid any possible confusion over the point, see Brilmaver & Kornbauser, upra note
8, at 135 n.68, it may be advisable to state the obvious: no knowledgeable student of probability
theory denies that Bayes' formula is mathematically correct. It is part and parcel of the theorv of
probability presented in every elementary text on the subject.
89 It is ,more common to write Bayes' formula in a slightly different form:
P(F)P(M I F)P(FI M) = P(F)P(MIF) 
--- [I-P(F)) P(MInot-F)
Dividing numerator and denominator of the right side by P(F)P(M IF) gives the version pre-
sented here.
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of a random match-the probability that a male selected at random
from the relevant population would have a genotype consistent with
the child's.
Thus, if these assumptions hold, P(Mlnot-F)-the probability of
a match, given that the male is not the father-is simply the genetic
frequency statistic. If mutation rates are negligible and the test shows
no false negatives, then P(MIF)-the probability of a match (M)
given that the defendant is the father-is one. The ratio f thus re-
duces to the genetic frequency statistic alone-it is the proportion of
men in the relevant population whose genotypes are consistent with
those found in the child.
An example may help to clarify, all this terminology. Suppose it is
agreed that the non-medical evidence establishes a .50 probability
that the defendant is the father. The medical evidence proves the
following: that the child's blood is type Al; that the mother's blood is
type 0, that the defendant's blood is type Ai; and that the frequency
of type Ai blood in the relevant population is .20. With the previ-
ously stated assumptions, if the defendant were the father, the prob-
ability of a match between defendant and child is one. The prob-
ability that the blood would be type A, if someone else selected at
random from the relevant population were the father is one-fifth,
since one-fifth of these men have type Ai blood. The fraction f is
therefore 1/5+ 1 = 1/5, and formula (1) indicates that after the evi-
dence on the blood is received the paternity probability should be
evaluated as:
1
P(F I M) = =5/6(1- + (/)( )
The blood type evidence has raised the probability in favor of pater-
nity from .50 to .83.
a. Present Practice-Since Bayes' Theorem is the accepted
mathematical technique for calculating conditional probabilities, it is
not surprising that it has been employed by experts testifying in re-
cent paternity disputes. It is surprising, however, that the currently
accepted technique allows the expert to make his own undisclosed
estimate of the prior probability in order to arrive at the probability
of paternity he presents to the jury. For instance, the expert who
testified for the prosecution in Cramer v. Morrison routinely calcu-
lates his "probability of paternity" by assuming that the non-test evi-
dence establishes a 50% chance that the defendant is the father. 90
90 Letter from Ray Mickey to David Kaye (Mar. 19, 1979); see Terasald, supra note 18.
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This is equivalent to supposing that the universe of possible fathers is
already reduced to two equally likely suspects before considering the
HLA test results. As the application of Bayes' Theorem shows, mak-
ing such an assumption ensures that in every case in which any, rec-
ognized blood test does not exclude the defendant, one will find that
he is probably the father, thus satisfying the burden of proof in civil
cases. 91 It is apparent from the court's opinion in Cramer that it did
not understand that such an assumption had been made. 92 Nor have
other courts displayed awareness of this point. 93
There seems to be no basis for the blanket assumption that the
prior probability is one-half. One might try to justify this assumption
by pointing to objective statistics about the probable accuracy of
plaintiffs' accusations of paternity. For instance, if 50% of paternity
cases are decided for defendants, one might think that the prior
probability should be taken to be .50. 94 A more refined and some-
what less objectionable method of calculating a prior probability is
based upon 1,515 Polish paternity cases from the early 1950's, in
which serologic tests revealed that, overall, the frequency of a "true"
accusation (one consistent with the blood tests) was about 70%. 95
91 See M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, at 93 n.58. Under the preponderance of the evidence
standard, a probability greater than one-half in favor of a disputed fact ordinarily justifies a
finding that the fact exists. See note 70 supra. If one starts with P(F) = %, one will arrive at a
P(F I M) in excess of 1/2 whenever the probability of exclusion is not one and the prior probabil-
ity P(F) is not zero.
92 See 88 Cal. App. 3d at 884, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
93 Opinions concerning the admissibility of HLA tests typically rely on statements or publi-
cations of experts who claim to be able to derive high probabilities of paternity through the use
of HLA tests. Such opinions evidence little understanding of the method by which the experts
calculate the probabilities. See County of Fresno v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 133, 137,
154 Cal. Rptr. 660, 662-63 (1979); Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 515, 401 A.2d 279,
279-80 (1979); Lascaris v. Lardeo, 100 Misc. 2d 220, 222-27, 417 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666-69 (Fam.
Ct. 1979); Goodrich v. Norman, 100 Misc. 2d 33, 38-39, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (Fain. Ct. 1979,
(reluctantly concluding that admission of the test results is barred by statute). Since few judges
would even know what a Bayesian calculation is, they can hardly be expected to see that the
expert's proposed use of this method involves legally improper assumptions.
94 See Weiner, supra note 35, at 125.
95 Steinhaus, The Establishment of Paternity, PRACE WROCLAWSKiEGO TOWARZYSTWA
NAuKOWEcO 5 (series A, no. 32 1954). Steinhaus' method is described in "slightly simplified"
terms in N1. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, at 74-75 & n.25, as follows:
The background or prior probability computed by Steinhaus was the probability that the
accused was the father after intercourse had been established but before the serological
test. The posterior probability was the probability of paternity after the test ....
Different blood types occur with different frequency in the population. Let the type
in question be called "A" and have the frequency f; the frequency of those who do not
have this type is 1-f. Consider the group of accused fathers who take a serological test
because the child has the blood type "A," one not shared by the mother. If the mothers'
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Similarly, a 1963 study of 1,000 paternity cases in New York City
found a figure of about 60%. 96 But even assuming perfect accord
among studies using the more discerning serologic techniques now
available, the prior probability these tests would yield would neces-
sarily be an average figure for paternity cases generally. Hence, the
propriety of its application to individual cases with varying degrees of
probative, non-test evidence is surely debatable.
To see why this is so, consider a case in which the mother tes-
tifies to having had intercourse with two men, and admits that the
intercourse had been more frequent with the one who is now out-
side the jurisdiction and unavailable for testing. A prior probability
of less than .50 would seem appropriate here, the average statistic
from all paternity cases notwithstanding. The credibility of the
mother's testimony and of the defendant's denials, as well as other
particularized considerations, may suggest still other departures from
the .50 figure. 97 In short, even the use of a well-founded prior
probability derived from general experience in other paternity litiga-
tion yields a "probability of paternity" figure that excludes considera-
tion of all the non-statistical evidence in that particular case. To label
such a figure the "probability of paternity" is surely misleading, espe-
cially when the jury is not informed that the expert's calculation is
based on such background statistics. One can imagine a case in which
the defendant has produced credible evidence that the mother had
accusations were always right, the serological test would show every member of this
group to have type "A" blood (although the converse of course is not true). If the
mothers' accusations were always wrong, the members of this group would be a random
sample from the population, and the expected frequency of those with other than type
"A" blood would be l-f. The difference between the actual rate of "A" blood in this
accused group and the population rate can be used to measure the accuracy of the ac-
cusations as a group. The more "A" blood, the more correct the accusations. [In particu-
lar,] [liet p be the proportion of the accused group who are the fathers. Then I-p is the
proportion of innocents and (1-p)(1-f) is the expected proportion of those accused who
will be exonerated by the test. The ratio of the expected proportion of the accused group
who will be exonerated to the proportion of those in the general population who do not
have the blood type in question is (1-p)(l-f)I(1-f). This ratio, however, is simply 1-p, the
prior probability of a false accusation. The key fact is that both numerator and de-
nominator of the foregoing ratio can be estimated from objective sample and population
statistics.
For an elaboration of the technique and its application to calculating the probability of pater-
nity, see Fairley, Probabilistic Analysis of Identification Evidence, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 493
(1973).
06 See Sussman, Blood Grouping Tests: A Review. of 1000 Cases of Disputed Paternity, 40
AM. J. CLIN. PATH. 38 (1963).
97 The mean figure derived from the type of analysis used by Steinhaus, supra note 95, is
optimal only in the sense that it can be expected to produce fewer errors than any other single
prior probability used in every paternity case.
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had intercourse with other men, but not with him, during the con-
ception period. Indeed, even had the defendant in Cramer shown
that he was imprisoned in another state during the critical period, the
expert's calcu'lation of a 98.3% chance of paternity would not have
been affected.
Furthermore, even if it were possible to convey the limited
character of this "probability of paternity" to the jury, use of this
figure would still be problematical for the very reason that its calcula-
tion relies upon such general information from other cases. We surely
would not allow the plaintiff in a civil case to present evidence that,
for example, most people sued for breach of contract are found liable.
Similarly, it sE ems doubtful at best that in a paternity case we should
or would ad' it evidence of the frequency with which accusations of
paternity were ultimately sustained in court. Such an offer of proof
would undoubtedly be rejected as both irrelevant and prejudicial,
since it is not based on facts sufficiently connected with the case at
bar. 98 It is thus hard to see how these same statistics can be intro-
duced by way of calculating a probability, whether done explicitly or
sub rosa.
b. The Chart Approaches-To avoid the presentation of a prob-
ability of paternity arrived at via undisclosed or arbitrary estimates of
the prior probability, each juror could be asked to consider all the
nonquantitative evidence in the case-to evaluate all the non-expert
testimony, making appropriate adjustments for the witnesses' appar-
ent credibility, et cetera-and to summarize his view of the case in
the form of an estimate of the probability that the defendant is the
father. Bayes' formula could then be used to show how the quantified
medical evidence should alter the estimates of the prior probability
applicable to the case at bar. To implement such a scheme, it has
been proposed that experts testifying about rare, identifying traits
should present a chart showing a range of hypothetical prior prob-
abilities and specifying the posterior probability associated with each
one. 99 In the hypothetical involving the subgroup Ai agglutino-
gen, 100 for instance, the expert might testify that if the jurors be-
lieve, apart from the statistical evidence, that there is a 10% chance
98 The use of a single number for P(F) also could lead to possible feedback effects, distorting
the accuracy of verdicts. If P(F) is taken to be large, say .70, based on past experience, then
potential plaintiffs may come to realize that any evidence of nonexclusion, nc matter how weak,
will produce expert testimony that the probability of paternity P(FI M) exceeds .70. See note 91
supra. This might encourage less meritorious suits, thereby lowering P(F).
99 This proposal is most fully developed in M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, at 85-104, and
Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 8. See also I. GOOD, PROBABILITY AND THE WEIGHING OF
EVIDENCE 66-67 (1950); Cullison, Identification by Probabilities and Trial by Arithmetic, 6
Hous. L. REv. 471, 484-502 (1969).
100 See section 111B2 supra.
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that the defendant fathered the child, they should believe that the
probability increases to 36% if they accept the statistical evidence;
that if they believe the non-test evidence shows a 25% chance, they
should conclude there is a 63% chance if they believe the statistical
evidence, and so on. This method of presentation will be called the
chart approach.
At this point, however, two versions of this chart approach can
be distinguished: one which places great emphasis on quantifying the
force of the evidence and one which allows more leeway for qualita-
tive evaluations. Under the former, each juror might be instructed to
choose the prior estimate that most closely matches his own view of
the strength of the non-test evidence and to gauge the impact of the
statistical evidence according to the chart. Further, the juror might
also be instructed to find that the defendant is the father whenever
Bayes' Theorem prescribes a probability of paternity in excess of .50,
or 50%. 101
Such reliance on statistical reasoning has been severely criticized
on both practical and theoretical grounds. 102 We believe the practi-
cal objections are well founded. First, instructing the jury to follow
the chart may be asking it to do something it cannot: to translate a
subjective opinion about the non-test evidence into a single probabil-
ity figure. Few people are accustomed to thinking in this numerical
manner; many jurors may be uncomfortable with it and unsure of
how to begin. 103 Second, in many instances, the instruction is un-
likely to be followed. Consider a juror who has no difficulty estimat-
ing the prior probability but finds that his initial assessment yields a
posterior probability of paternity that departs from his intuitive judg-
ment of the entire package of evidence. For example, Bayes'
Theorem tells him that the probability of paternity is 65%, but he
does not really believe that the defendant is the father. This juror
might lower his estimate of the prior probability to reach an intui-
tively attractive final result. Since experimental studies suggest that
'l But see text accompanying notes 122-31 infra.
102 See L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977); R. EGGLESTON, supra note 1,
at 146-47; Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 8, at 135-52; Tribe, supra note 8, at 1354-68;
Tribe, supra note 68.
103 A juror's estimate of the prior probability might therefore be unreliable. See Tribe, supra
note 8, at 1348-49. To accommodate this uncertainty in the estimation of P(F), one could use
Bayes' formula to calculate the effect of the medical evidence on a distribution of prior prob-
abilities rather than a point estimate of P(F). See, e.g., H. BRUNK, supra note 87, at 175-76.
Asking jurors to specify a probability density function (or merely a range of values for P(F)),
however, would only magnify the difficulty many jurors might experience in stating a single
estimate of P(F).
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people intuitively process information differently than Bayes' formula
states they should, 104 this prospect is not unlikely. Nor is there any,
practical way to preclude jurors from adjusting their prior prob-
abilities in this circular fashion. 105
Rejecting the chart as a device for instructing jurors as to what
verdict to reach, however, does not preclude introducing the chart
into evidence for the purpose of educating or informing the jury. 106
We are still left with the problem of helping the jurors to appreciate
the meaning of the statement that the defendant possesses alleles
which the father must have and which only some specified percent of
the population share. The most accurate way of displaying the signifi-
cance of this number is through a probability calculation. We might,
therefore, allow an expert to employ a chart solely as a pedagogical
technique. Under this modified chart approach, the jurors would be
cautioned that the chart is intended merely to aid them in under-
standing the significance of the medical evidence and that the), are in
no sense bound to follow it.
This version of the chart approach has a number of advantages
over the binding use of Bayes' formula as well as over the alternative
methods of presenting the statistical evidence. Use of the chart as a
heuristic device does not purport to require the jurors to employ
formal statistical methodology. 107 Neither would it compel resisting
jurors to commit themselves to any prior probability. Since the jurors
104 See, e.g., C. CoomBs, R. DAWES, & A. TVERSKY, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN
ELEMENTARY INTRODUCTION 145-47 (1975); M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, at 92 n.57; Slovic.
Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory, 28 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 1 (1977);
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Indi-
vidualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1428 & n.54 (1979) (citing authorities).
105 In theory, one could force compliance with Bayes' formula by not revealing the chart to
the jury and asking the jurors to deliberate until they agree upon an estimate of the prior
probability. The court could then consult the chart and return the indicated verdict. So radical a
restructuring of the trial process is most unlikely. In addition, "any method that is profoundly
counterintuitive inspires suspicion and distrust, and detracts from [one's] sense that he has been
evaluated by a legitimate process." Underwood, supra note 104, at 1429.
106 It might be argued that introduction of the probabilities with instructions to follow the
chart might still induce many jurors to deviate at least slightly from their untutored, intuitive
judgments, even if the instructions are not strictly obeyed. But, if this is what is desired-and
it should be remembered that we first turned to Bayes' Theorem only to find a workable device
for revealing the logical import of the statistical data now available in many paternity cases-it
is preferable to use a candid, straightforward approach.
107 We recognize that one function of the jury may be to inject certain nonrational considera-
tions into the trial process. Indeed, that is one reason we are wary of demanding rigorous
compliance with Bayesian analysis. See note 105 supra. Nonetheless, we believe jurors should
be given the opportunity, if it is feasible to do so, of appreciating the logical import of the
statistical evidence. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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are not so constrained, the objection that they may be unable to
quantify their subjective beliefs with much precision is also less
telling. It is enough that they can scan the chart to see the impact the
test data logically should have across a range of starting points.
We do not advance this chart approach with any unrealistic ex-
pectations of jurors' abilities to comprehend Bayes' Theorem or prob-
ability theory, for such mathematical acumen is not required. Nor do
we believe that all jurors will necessarily appreciate what the chart
really means. Undoubtedly, many will not. But no reasonably accu-
rate method of introducing tissue typing or blood test evidence can
avoid this problem of complexity. A strictly qualitative presentation
is, as we have seen, fraught with difficulties. 108 Overtly quantitative
statements of the genetic frequency statistic, standing alone or ac-
companied with an explanation of why the probability of exclusion is
not the same as the probability of paternity, also have potential for
confusion. In fact, many jurors may find such testimony more
perplexing than a well-presented chart of the resulting probabilities.
We can only speculate as to which presentation will be, on balance,
more comprehensible to juries. In the absence of strong evidence
that the more accurate and complete presentation is somehow more
likely to confuse, it should be regarded as the preferable method for
presenting the statistical information.
Nevertheless, commentators have voiced a variety of other criti-
cisms of the chart approach. First, a Bayesian (or any other) probabil-
ity calculation involving statistical identification evidence can only tell
the jury the likelihood that the defendant committed the act in ques-
tion; it cannot supply any information about his state of mind during
the commission of the act. 109 This is an important point in consider-
ing the use of statistical evidence in a criminal case. For example,
discovering that the defendant's palm print matches the unusual print
left at the scene of the crime may persuade us that he committed the
act, but it cannot tell us whether he acted with malice, a point that
may be crucial to the verdict. Such questions of intent do not cus-
tomarily arise in paternity suits, however, where the issue is whether
the defendant is the biological father of the complainant's child. 110
A second criticism concerns the possibility of a frame-up. It is
always possible that the evidence that will be reflected in the statisti-
cal computation has been created for the very purpose of implicating
"I8 See section IIIA supra.
109 See Tribe, supra note 8, at 1365-66.
110 This point would be relevant, however, if the same blood test evidence were offered in a
rape prosecution, where the alleged rapist impregnated the victim who then bore his child.
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the defendant. Someone could plant a fragment of another's hair or
an item containing another's fingerprint, for example, at an in-
criminating location. The Bayesian calculation does not take this into
account, although in theory it could. "I Yet, this concern would
rarely arise in paternity litigation, since it would be most unusual for
the defendant's genetic endowment to be planted without his cooper-
ation. Although the frame-up problem thus may not be directly
applicable to paternity cases, it does suggest a parallel concern: if the
probability of false test results is, contrary to our assumptions, not
negligible, the calculations implicit in the chart should incorporate
the probabilities of such errors. 112 If sloppy laboratory work makes
it difficult to quantify the probabilities of mistakes in the clinical tests,
defense counsel should make it plain by cross-examination or argu-
ment that the numbers in the chart overstate the probability of
paternity.
Third, it is conceivable that some jurors faced with a chart might
give undue weight to the statistical evidence by unconsciously allow-
ing these figures to influence their assessment of the prior probabil-
ity. Adhering to the chart in arriving at the probability of paternity,
they would unjustifiably count the same evidence a second time. 113
This problem might be minimized by presenting the chart only -after
all the other evidence has been received. 114 In addition, "double
counting" is a less weighty objection to the modified chart approach
which does not require jurors to plug their own numbers into the
probability equation. Consequently, this last criticism provides
another reason for preferring a modified use of the chart method over
a more rigorous application of Bayes' Theorem.
In addition to these practical objections-which do not seem to
supply compelling grounds for dismissing the modified chart
approach-several rather theoretical challenges to using Bayesian cal-
culations in legal factfinding have been advanced. 115 Some of these
arguments dispute the appropriateness of using any of the accepted
"' See Fairley, supra note 95, at 493; Tribe, supra note 8, at 1363-64.
112 Cf. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021, 1024 n.19 (1977) (expressing
concern over uncertainty in the values of the conditional probabilities that determine the value
of the quantity f defined by equation (2) at text accompanying note 89 supra).
113 See Tribe, supra note 8, at 1366-68.
114 See Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 68, at 1807.
115 See L. COHEN, supra note 102, at 34-37; Brilmayer & Kornbauser, supra note 8, at
135-48; Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92
HARv. L. REv. 1187, 1199 n.27 (1978).
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techniques of probability and statistics in the legal realm. 116 How-
ever, the primary objection to employing Bayes' formula at trial does
not deny that the equation produces mathematically correct re-
suits. 117 It asserts instead that the prior probability one proposes to
use is somehow not a "true" probability and that this subjectively
ascertained number cannot be combined meaningfully by Bayes'
Theorem with an objectively derived figure like the genetic fre-
quency. That is, this objection contends that even in theory jurors
cannot produce by subjective methods a number which obeys the
probability axioms. Whether or not this view is convincing, 118 it is of
little consequence as applied to the modified chart approach. That
approach does not ask the jurors to produce such a number. It
merely shows them how a correctly ascertained probability would be
altered, if one were in fact available. In this way it accurately com-
municates the significance of the admittedly probabilistic scientific
evidence, without requiring the remaining evidence to be expressed
as a probability. 119 Hence, we conclude that the use of the modified
chart approach to show the probative force of the statistical evidence
derived from HLA or other tests meets the criteria of mathematical
accuracy and general intelligibility. The approach is defensible on
both practical and theoretical grounds, and it may well represent the
best single method for explaining what the medical evidence proves.
In sum, while modem medical techniques can produce relevant
evidence of paternity, the method by which recent cases have al-
lowed such evidence to be presented is unsatisfactory. Two alterna-
tive methods, the data approach and the modified chart approach, are
clearly preferable. The data approach prevents the expert from tes-
tifying to the probability of paternity, but gives the jury little
guidance in evaluating the statistical evidence. The approach is con-
sistent with the use of statistical identification evidence outside the
116 See L. COHEN, supra note 102, at 49-120; Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 8, at
137-46. These authors suggest that jurors should weigh evidence according to a fundamentally
different mathematical structure-one in which the probability that an event will happen and
the probability that it will not do not necessarily add up to one. Their arguments in favor of
such a system are criticized in Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U.
CHi. L. REv. 34 (1979); Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARiz.
ST. L.J. 101; Williams, The Mathematics of Proof I, CrM. L. REv., May 1979, at 305; Schum,
Book Review, 77 MICH. L. REv. 446 (1979); Wagner, Book Review, supra note 8.
117 See note 88 supra.
118 For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the
Land, supra note 116, at 41-47.
119 Cf. Sprott & Kalbfleisch, Use of the Likelihood Function in Inference, 64 PSYCH. BULL.
354 (1965) (advocating that the likelihood ratio be used in evaluating scientific hypotheses even
if prior or posterior probabilities are not computed).
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context of paternity. The modified chart approach, on the other hand,
is more innovative. It is mathematically more appealing and, we be-
lieve, no less practicable. It would represent a marked improvement
over the status quo in two respects. First, it would result in a figure
more aptly called the probability of paternity and the meaning of
which is more readily apparent to the jury. Second, it would preclude
the expert from imposing his own view of the prior probability-a
view that is necessarily founded on ad hoc assumptions or inadmissi-
ble background statistics derived from earlier paternity cases.
Although this method of presentation may seem to depart from tradi-
tional evidentiary techniques, such novelty, in and of itself, cannot
count as a serious argument against the approach. Novel and unfamil-
iar types of evidence frequently are viewed, at first, with suspicion.
For example, it was only a few decades ago that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that annuity tables could not be shown to a jury
because "[t]he less jurors are burdened with complicated tables and
the necessity for complex calculations, the more likely they will be to
do substantial justice."' 20  Today, such views seem quaint, for we
have become familiar with the concept of discounting to present
value, and the courts have become comfortable with such tables. In
terms of courtroom procedure and practice, there seems to be no
reason why probability charts could not enjoy similar acceptance. 121
However, we cannot unconditionally endorse the use of confir-
matory HLA or blood test evidence, even when it is suitably
explained and presented via the data or modified chart approach. One
final issue, which concerns the sufficiency of the evidence, must be
attended to.
c. The Problem of Insufficient Evidence-Although modern
serologic testing can often provide highly probative evidence of
paternity which can be usefully expressed as a final probability of
paternity, it does not follow that such evidence should always be ad-
mitted, even if the correctly calculated probability of paternity is
120 Moore v. Leininger, 299 Pa. 380, 385, 149 A. 662, 664 (1930). In response to Moon,
McCormick wrote in 1935 that "the courts should shift from the present extreme emphasis upon
caution in the use of the tables to a willingness for actuarial witnesses in their testimony and
counsel in argument to develop the application of these statistical methods . .. to their full
limits of usefulness." C. McCORMiCK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 86, at 307
(1935).
121 Blood testing based on the ABO system, it will be recalled, met with strong judicial
resistance. See text accompanying note 22 supra. Similarly, the now commonplace technique" of
statistical inference in jury selection and employment discrimination cases lagged far behind the
recognition of the validity of these tools by academics and practicing lawyers.
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quite high. The reason is not that the probability calculation is defec-
tive, but rather that the policy of promoting accurate verdicts may be
furthered in the long run by barring plaintiffs from recovering when
they choose not to introduce more revealing evidence which is
reasonably available to them. 122
A simplified version of a typical fact pattern in paternity litigation
illustrates how this rationale limits the overenthusiastic use of
serologic test results. Suppose it is known that the mother has had
sexual relations with approximately equal frequency with each of
three men and only these three during the time period in which con-
ception almost surely occurred. For reasons not disclosed at trial,
only the defendant was given an HLA test, the results of which do
not exclude him as the father. Suit was therefore brought against
him. The expert testifies that the probability of a random match-the
haplotype frequency-in this particular test is .30, or 30%. The re-
sult of a Bayes' calculation shows that if the prior probability of pater-
nity is taken to be one-third, on the ground that defendant is one of
the only three equally likely suspects, the HLA test results increase
the probability of paternity to .63, or 63%. 123 No other information
is presented. Should the jury be permitted to find for the plaintiff on
this evidence? At first blush, the probability seems sufficient to meet
the burden of proof ordinarily imposed in civil cases, 124 suggesting
that a verdict for the plaintiff is justified. The problem, however, is
the plaintiff's failure, without explanation, to test any of the other
defendants. The probability that the test would implicate at least one
of the other two men is actually quite high. 125 At the same time, it
would not seem difficult for plaintiff to eliminate this substantial and
lingering doubt. Unless the plaintiff produces some satisfactory expla-
nation for her failure to obtain such test results, her case should not
be allowed to go to the jury.
The most obvious explanation which might be offered, of course,
is that the two other men cannot be found. This is usually satisfactory
122 See Kaye, supra note 3; Tribe, supra note 8, at 1349 (to create "an incentive for plaintiffs
to do more than establish the background statistics," verdicts should be directed against plain-
tiffs who rely exclusively on statistical evidence).
12 3 This probability is obtained from equations (1) and (2), with f=.30 and P(F)=1/3.
124 The preponderance of the evidence standard can be interpreted quantitatively to mean
evidence establishing that the probability in favor of a proposition exceeds .50, or 50%. See note
70 supra.
125 This probability is easily calculated from the definition of conditional probability. Assum-
ing that the selection of the three men is random as regards HLA haplotypes, the probability
that neither the second (M2) nor the third (M3) man tested will have the paternal haplotype for
the child in question given the fact that the defendant (Mi) does match is given by:
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if true. 126 But when the other men are available, and no other satis-
factory explanation for the incomplete testing appears, the plaintiff
should be barred from relying on the HLA evidence until more com-
prehensive testing has been performed. It is poor policy to encourage
plaintiffs to stop testing at the first lucky strike. 127
P(not-M 2 & not-MI3 & M1 )
P(not-M 2 & not-M 3 1M1) = P(M &\P(M 1)
Since the events in the numerator of the right hand side are independent, we have
P(not - M 2)P(not - M3)P(M 1)
P(not-M 2 & not-M 3 1M1) = P( -1)P(M 1)
= P(not -M 2 )P(not- MI3 )
- (1-0(1-0 = (1-.30)2 = .49
where f is the frequency of the particular HLA haplotype in the relevant population. The prob-
ability that at least one of the two untested men will match is therefore given by
P(M2 or M 2 1M1) = 1-P(not-M 2 & not-M 31M 1)
= 1- .49 = .51
More generally, where the number of possible fathers is N (in our example, N = 3), the
probability that at least one of the N - 1 untested men would match if tested is
P(M2 or M3 or ... or MN MI) = 1-(1-O
N - 1
These results can also be derived starting with Bayes' Theorem rather than the definition of
conditional probability. See Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Storit, . 'upra
note 116, at 104-08.
126 See generally W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 92 (10th ed. 1973); 2 J. WIGM ORE, EvI-
DENCE § 286 (3d ed. 1940); Comment, Drawing an Inference from the Failure to Produce' a
Knowledgeable Witness: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1422 (1973). Even when a particular person is not available for testing, however, his genotype
can sometimes be deduced from tests performed on his relatives. See W. BODMER & L.
CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 17, at 248.
127 Even when the genetic frequency and the number of realistic suspects are small, so that
the probability of paternity is quite high and the likelihood that one of the untested suspects
will also match is low, plaintiff should be required to act, if feasible, to minimize doubt.
Weiner, supra note 35, provides a case in point. He describes an instance in which "there . .
were hvo and only two men either one of whom, the mother stated, could be the father of her
child." Id. at 127-28. However, only one of the two men was available for testing, and the
series of blood tests performed showed that the probability of a random match was about .01, or
1%. Since there were two possible fathers, and Dr. Weiner had no reason to think one .vaN
more likely than the other to be the father, he applied Bayes' Theorem to a prior probability of
one-halE. The resulting posterior probability was 74/75, or nearly .99. He informed the court
that the blood test results established a probability of paternity of this magnitude. T%%o and a half
years later, the court sent the second man for testing. As Dr. Weiner put it: "The setond man
was not excluded either, contrary to expectations. Thus, in the final report to the court, the
authors had to point out that the likelihood of paternity was almost the same for the thxo men,
and that the completed findings were inconclusive as to paternity." Id. at 128.
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The same logic also bears on how extensive a battery of serologic
tests should be performed on a particular suspect in order to establish
an adequate foundation for the admissibility of the medical evidence.
When paternity is not excluded after searching for one genetic
marker, the laboratory can almost always look for another. 128 Each
additional test, however, adds to the cost, and the point of diminish-
ing returns is quickly reached. 129 As a rough guide, we recommend
that, for confirmatory test data to be admissible under any of the
approaches we have listed, testing be continued until the probability
of exclusion for the battery of tests performed exceeds .95, or
95%. 130 Although there is nothing magic about this particular figure,
testing to establish such probabilities should usually be available at a
reasonable cost131 and yields results too probative to withhold from
the jury.
CONCLUSION
Advancing medical technology has produced tests which offer the
opportunity to resolve paternity disputes with more accuracy than
unaided traditional evidentiary techniques are likely to obtain. Proper
understanding of the test results, however, requires statistical reason-
ing with which courts are typically unfamiliar. As a result, recent
cases have allowed experts to state probabilities of paternity which
have had little relevance to the cases at bar. Nevertheless, such mis-
use of available techniques should not preclude their proper applica-
tion, since they can produce results highly probative of paternity. It
128 There are hundreds, if not thousands, of genetic markers in the HLA system alone. See
text accompanying note 39 supra.
129 As an illustration, suppose that four tests have been done which, in combination, exclude
90% of falseh accused men, and it is proposed to do another test offering a 10% exclusion rate.
Of the men excluded by this additional test, 90% will already have been excluded by the prior
tests. Hence, the new test would raise the probability of exclusion from 90 to only 91%.
Weiner, supra note 35, at 128-29.
An additional test also would increase the likelihood of a false negative, or spurious exclu-
sion. As the number of independent tests approaches infinity, the probability of this type of
error approaches one.
1:," The problem of defining an appropriate "'stopping rule" and analyzing its implications is
quite complex. See generally A. WALD, SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS (1947); Cornfield, Sequential
Trials, Sequential Analysis and the Likelihood Principle, 20 Ami. STATISTICIAN 18 (1966). The
rule Nuggested here is meant to be illustrative rather than definitive.
131 HLA testing involving about 50 antigens can be completed within a day and costs about
$300 when administered to mother, child, and one man. Cannady, supra note 7, at 18. Tests for
red blood cell antigens cost about $50 per person. Iascaris v. Lardeo, 100 Misc. 2d 220, 223,
417 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (Fam. Ct. 1979).
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is possible to convey the meaning of the test results to the jury most
accurately through the use of probability charts which preserve the
jury's role of resolving the disputed factual claims present in particu-
lar cases. A more restricted presentation of the statistical information,
focusing exclusively on the underlying statistical data, also would be
preferable to existing methods. Care should be taken, however, to
ensure that plaintiffs who seek to introduce such tests employ them
with adequate thoroughness to justify judicial reliance on them.
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